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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLICATION OF THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE OF LEX LOCI 
DELICTI IS INAPPROPRIATE IN WORKMENS COMPENSATION CASES 
One major issue in this case which both Defendants have failed 
to recognize and address is that the doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti 
is applied to determine which state's tort law should be applied, 
not which state's workers' compensation laws apply, A workers' 
compensation case such as the one now before this Court, presents 
an entirely different set of problems than does a traditional tort 
case where a resident of one state is injured in another. 
Consequently, such a case also presents different choice of law 
problems. The Defendants are asking this Court to apply a tort 
choice of law doctrine to determine which state's workers' 
compensation laws applies. Their logic is that if Nevada's 
workers' compensation laws are applied, then those statutes will 
bar any right by this Plaintiff to pursue a third party action. 
As stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Simaitis v. 
Flood, 437 A.2d 828, 831 (Conn. 1980), "the place-of-injury rule 
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affords only an unsatisfactory resolution to the workers' 
compensation choice of laws problem." 
The choice of law in workers' compensation cases is the law of 
the state which paid the workers' compensation benefits and where 
the employment relationship commenced. Id. at 833. 
Defendant, Steel Deck, claims that Lex Loci Delicti needs to 
be applied, otherwise chaos will ensue with different outcomes in 
different states. Defendants fail to recognize that the 
application of Lex Loci Delicti will provide uncertainty and 
different results in any event. Under their theory, a Nevada 
resident, hired in Nevada by a Nevada employer who is injured in 
Utah would be allowed to seek recovery for his damages applying 
Utah's workers' compensation laws. A different result than the one 
they would like to have this Court impose on the Plaintiff and 
other Utah residents in his position who are injured in another 
state while temporarily working there for a Utah employer. 
Defendant, Steel Deck, claims that Lex Loci Delicti promotes 
stability in the law, predictability of results, justice among the 
parties and prevents the scourge of forum shopping. 
The application of the workers' compensation choice of law 
rule advocated by this Plaintiff would provide the same "stability" 
which Steel Deck feels needs to be safeguarded. 
The application of the workers' compensation laws of the state 
where the injured party was hired and where he receives his 
workers' compensation benefits provides a uniform application of 
the law. Granted, if an injured party is from a state which bars 
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third party actions and he is injured in another state which may 
grant such a right to its residents, he will be barred from 
pursuing his lawsuit. Such a result is no less predictable than 
the application of Lex Loci Delicti. 
The rule advocated by the Plaintiff provides uniformity of 
justice among the parties and likewise prevents "the scourge of 
forum shopping" since the law to be applied, no matter where the 
action is initiated, is that of the state where the injured party 
is employed and received workersf compensation benefits. 
In its brief, Steel Deck poses the question: "which law would 
apply if the injured party seeking to maintain a negligence action 
were not a resident of Utah?" (Steel Deck's Brief at 12). Although 
this issue is not now before this Court on appeal, the answer is 
quite simple. The workers' compensation law of the state where he 
or she was employed and received workers' compensation benefits 
would apply in determining whether he has the right to bring such 
an action. 
If others were injured on the Nevada Project as a result of a 
third party's negligence, the right to pursue that action against 
that third-party will be determined by the workers' compensation 
laws of their state of employment and where they received their 
workers' compensation benefits. Under this scenario, if, for 
example, a California resident was injured on the Project due to 
Steel Deck's or Layton's negligence, he or she could commence an 
action in Utah or California, but the trial court should apply 
California's workers' compensation laws, which, by the way, allows 
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third-party actions as does Utah's. 
The residents of the individual states should be able to rely 
on their home state's labor and industrial laws as they move across 
state lines for temporary work. Obviously, someone in this 
Plaintiff's position who was hired in Utah by a Utah employer 
should have a reasonable expectation that if he is injured while 
temporarily working in another state, that the employment and labor 
laws of the state of Utah, including the workers' compensation 
laws, would provide him with all of the relief afforded by that 
statute. This includes the right under Utah Code Annotated §35-1-
62, 1953 as amended, to bring a negligence action against any third 
party who may have contributed to or caused the injuries to the 
injured worker. 
POINT II 
LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT UTAH'S WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT 
WHERE A UTAH WORKER IS INJURED IN ANOTHER STATE 
The main thrust of Plaintiff's argument is that in a workers' 
compensation conflict issue, the workers' compensation laws of the 
state where the injured worker was hired and received workers' 
compensation benefits should be applied in determining whether a 
third party action may be brought. Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 
1180 (5th Cir. 1985), O'Connor v. Lee-Hv Paving Corp. , 579 F.2d 194 
(2nd Cir. 1978), certiorari denied, Gillespie v. Schwartz, 493 U.S. 
1034, 99 S.Ct. 638, 58 L.Ed.2d 696, Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 
F.Supp. 871 (D.C.N.Y. 1983), Fox v. Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603 (Conn. 
Suppr. 1990), Fagan v. John J. Casale, Inc., 16 Misc.2d 1046, 184 
6 
N.Y.S.2d 109 (1959) . 
Plaintiff was hired in Utah, his employer is a Utah 
corporation and he sought and received workersf compensation 
benefits in Utah. If this Court adopts this rule, then it is 
apparent as pointed out in Plaintiff's initial brief that he has a 
right under Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62 to seek recovery for his 
injuries from negligent third parties, including the appellees 
herein. 
In his initial brief, Plaintiff argued that Utah's Workers1 
Compensation Act has extraterritorial effect and grants the right 
to bring a third party action even when the injuries occur outside 
of this state. In its brief, Defendants Steel Deck assails 
Plaintiff !s argument with the absurd statement that Plaintiff cited 
"dubious" cases to support his position (Steel Deck's Brief at 14). 
Plaintiff finds it curious that Defendant Steel Deck would 
characterize decisions of this and other courts on this issue as 
having dubious merit while at the same time failing to cite any 
cases whatsoever which support its position to the contrary. 
Instead, Defendant Steel Deck embarks on its own interpretation of 
Utahf s workers' compensation statutes without providing any case 
law which supports that interpretation. Accordingly, Steel Deck's 
unsupported argument on this position should stand on its own. 
Defendant Layton makes the allegation that: 
Although probably irrelevant, Plaintiff has 
gone so far as to misstate in his Statement of 
Facts that he filed this action for negligence 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
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Annotated §35-1-62 . . .to recover damages 
from negligent third parties including the 
defendants. (Layton's Brief at 9). 
Layton was correct by stating that this issue is irrelevant. 
It is not an issue on appeal and Plaintiff's action is not 
defective simply because the statute was not cited in his 
Complaint. Furthermore, the trial court's Findings of Fact on 
Layton's own Motion to Dismiss states: "1. This is an action 
brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62, 1953 as amended." 
(R. 321-329). Layton was given ample opportunity to object to the 
trial court's findings but failed to do so and it is absolutely 
inappropriate to now raise this issue on appeal. 
Furthermore, Layton mischaracterizes Plaintiff's position 
regarding the application of §35-1-54 to this case. Plaintiff does 
not contend that §35-1-54 is a statutory exception to Lex Loci 
Delicti. Rather, Plaintiff's argument is that Lex Loci Delicti is 
not applicable and that §35-1-54, together with the cited 
authorities, support the proposition that Utah's Workmen's 
Compensation Act has extraterritorial effect and provides all 
benefits under the Act to Utah workers who are injured while 
temporarily working in another state. This includes the right 
under §35-1-62 to bring a third party action such as the one now 
before this Court. 
POINT III 
APPLICATION OF "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" AND/OR 
"INTEREST ANALYSIS" APPROACH IS INAPPROPRIATE IN 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES 
In their briefs, Defendants incorrectly characterize 
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Plaintiff's position as being one which advocates a combination of 
the "most significant contacts" and "interest analysis" tests 
applied in tort choice of law cases which have rejected the 
traditional Lex Loci Delicti doctrine. 
Plaintiff is advocating the rule established by the 
authorities cited herein and in his initial brief that simply 
states that the workers' compensation law of the state where the 
injured party was hired and where he received his workers' 
compensation benefits should be applied in determining whether he 
can proceed with a third party negligence suit. The "most 
significant contacts" and "interest analysis" approaches deal 
strictly with common law tort actions and not workersf compensation 
cases. 
Restatement "Second" Conflicts of Law §145 provides: 
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state 
which, as to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and 
the parties under the principals stated in §6. 
(emphasis added) 
The issue now before this Court is not one of tort law, but 
one of workers1 compensation law. As stated in Hauch v. Connor, 
453 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Md. 1983): 
{M}any courts recognize that workman's 
compensation law conflict issues present 
distinct policy questions and should not be 
treated as tort or contract matters for choice 
of law purposes. We agree with this approach, 
(emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the tort choice of law approaches addressed by 
Defendants should not be considered in the context of this, a 
£ 
workers' compensation case, since there are several policy reasons 
which weigh against such an approach. Those policy considerations 
were addressed in this Plaintiff's initial Brief. However, 
Plaintiff, for the purpose of clarifying this issue, would like to 
reiterate that those policy reasons include: 
1. Utah has an interest in protecting the rights of its 
residents who are hired in Utah by Utah employers. 
2. Utah has a right to regulate and oversee contracts of 
employment which are executed in this state. 
3. Utah has the right to protect the reasonable expectation 
of individuals hired in this state that they will be covered by and 
afforded the protection of Utah's workers' compensation laws, 
including the right under §35-1-62 to pursue legal action for the 
recovery of damages due to the negligence of a third party. 
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the "most 
significant contacts" or "interest analysis" approaches are applied 
in this case, Plaintiff contends that the factors which are weighed 
would heavily favor the state of Utah and the application of its 
workers' compensation law. Under the "most significant contacts" 
analysis, Plaintiff concedes that the place of the injury and the 
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred are in Nevada. 
However, with respect to the second two factors, it is clear from 
the record that the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and the place 
where the relationship between the parties is centered is clearly 
within the state of Utah. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff, at 
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the time of his injury was a resident of the state of Utah, his 
employer, Harv & Higham Masonry together with the two Defendants 
herein were Utah corporations with their principal places of 
business being in Salt Lake City, Utah. Furthermore, the 
relationship between all of the parties was clearly centered in 
Salt Lake City which was the location where the subcontracts 
between Layton, Steel Deck and Harv & Higham Masonry were executed. 
The Plaintiff was hired by his employer, Harv & Higham Masonry, in 
the state of Utah. 
Under the "most significant contacts" analysis, there are two 
factors which favor the state of Nevada and two factors which favor 
the state of Utah. Under this analysis, the Court is then faced 
with the dilemma of which factor should be afforded the most weight 
and consideration in determining which statef s workersf 
compensation law should be applied. "The mere counting of contacts 
should not be determinative of the law to be applied, but it is 
rather the relevancy of the contact in the terms of policy 
considerations important to the forum, vis-a-vis, other contact 
states." 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws §8(4), citing Wilcox v. 
Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408. Plaintiff has previously addressed and 
pointed out the policy considerations which he feels give the state 
of Utah a greater interest in the application of its workersf 
compensation laws. As stated in Wilson v. Faull, 141 A. 2d 768, 774 
(N.J. 1958), the forum state in a workers1 compensation case has a 
sufficient interest in the work injury to justify the application 
of its own law. Further, the Court in Wilson held that the fact 
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that an employment contract is made within a state is deemed a 
sufficient interest to satisfy the full faith and credit clause of 
the United States Constitution. Id. at 775. 
Once again, Plaintiff submits that while although the injury 
and the conduct giving rise to the injury occurred in Nevada, there 
are several other factors in this particular case which need to be 
seriously considered by this Court in determining that Utah has 
sufficient interests and contacts to apply its own workers1 
compensation law. 
Defendant, Steel Deck, in its brief, seems to be making the 
argument that it would unreasonable for other subcontractors such 
as Bilt-Rite and I. Christensen to expect to be brought before a 
Utah court in a personal injury case where an allegation of 
negligence on their part is made. One only need to examine the 
facts of this case which clearly demonstrate that these 
subcontractors executed a subcontract in Salt Lake City, Utah with 
Layton Construction Company, Inc. which is a Utah corporation. It 
is reasonably foreseeable that whenever a party executes such a 
contract in the state of Utah, he or it may be brought before the 
courts of this state to answer for its conduct or misconduct during 
the performance of its obligations under that contract. 
Defendants, time and time again make the inference that the state 
of Nevada is a potential Defendant in this case. Plaintiff feels 
that this is a ludicrous argument since there has been no 
indication whatsoever that the state of Nevada was negligent in any 
way in contributing to Plaintiff's injuries. Notwithstanding this 
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argument, the state of Nevada, likewise, hired as its general 
contractor, a Utah corporation and it would not be unreasonable to 
expect the state of Nevada to have to answer for its performance 
under the terms of the contract. However, the issue of 
jurisdiction over a dispute between two states is not now before 
this Court and is not now subject to review. 
Defendant, Steel Deck, also argues that Nevada's relation to 
the parties is equal to or greater than Utahfs relation. Once 
again, Plaintiff contends that this argument is without any 
foundation whatsoever. The Appellees in this case are both Utah 
corporations, hired Utah residents as employees, and executed and 
entered into employment contracts and subcontracts in the state of 
Utah. Obviously, the state of Utah has a very close relationship 
to the parties herein and has a legitimate interest in overseeing 
those relationships, especially where a Utah resident is injured 
while performing his services under the terms of a contract of 
employment which was entered into in this state and where the 
injured party received workers1 compensation benefits under Utah 
law and subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah Industrial 
Commission. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S35-1-62 CONTEMPLATES 
AND PROVIDES REMEDY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY 
NEGLIGENT THIRD PARTIES WHO DO NOT PROVIDE 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
In its brief, Defendant, Steel Deck, makes the argument that 
this Plaintiff's workers1 compensation benefits are adequate and 
sufficient to meet his needs. It states that an injured employee 
II 
cannot choose to seek more money by initiating lawsuits. (Steel 
Deck's Brief at 22). Such an argument clearly runs contrary to the 
intention of the Utah Legislature to provide various remedies to 
workers who are injured while working within the course and scope 
of their employment. Under the Act, the Plaintiff's employer's 
obligation has been met due to the fact that it has fulfilled its 
legal requirement of providing the Plaintiff with workers' 
compensation insurance. The Plaintiff has been compensated under 
the policy of insurance and the employer's obligation thereunder 
has been discharged. 
However, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62, the 
Plaintiff is afforded the right to pursue a third party action 
against negligent tortfeasors who contributed to or caused his 
injuries and who did not provide his workers' compensation 
insurance. Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah 
1989), and Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431 (Utah, 
1989). 
Defendant, Steel Deck, seems to be arguing that since 
Plaintiff has recovered benefits from the workers' compensation 
insurance carrier, all of this state's interests in the case are 
satisfied and that his statutory right to pursue a negligence 
action and this state's interest in providing and preserving that 
right are somehow unimportant. To deprive the Plaintiff of this 
right would have a significant impact on the Plaintiff and others 
in his position. Plaintiff's recovery of workers' compensation 
benefits is really insignificant in comparison with the substantial 
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damages which he has sustained. Granted, the Plaintiff will be 
provided with medical coverage for his injuries for the duration of 
his life. However, the other elements of damages involved in this 
case have not been clearly disposed of or taken care of by his 
recovery of workers1 compensation benefits. It is obvious that 
these factors were taken into consideration by the Utah Legislature 
when it enacted §35-1-62 in allowing an injured worker to seek the 
recovery of additional damages from negligent third parties instead 
of enacting a statute similar to that of Nevada which bars any such 
claims and provides that workers' compensation is the sole and 
exclusive remedy. Obviously, the Utah Legislature felt that it was 
important to provide this remedy in an effort to provide an optimum 
recovery for injured workers v/ho are hired in this state. 
For the various policy reasons discussed in this Plaintiff's 
initial brief and those reasons stated herein, it is clear and 
obvious that the stace of Utah has greater interests in applying 
its own workers1 compensation laws and that the contacts with the 
state of Utah are significant enough to apply its workers1 
compensation law should this Court adopt this analysis. However, 
Plaintiff would like to reiterate his position and argument that 
the appropriate rule to be applied in this and other cases of its 
kind is the law of the state where the injured employee was hired 
and which paid the injured employeers workers1 compensation 
benefits. As in this case, if those workers1 compensation laws 
provide a remedy to pursue a third party negligence claim, then 
that right should be granted to the employee who has received 
15 
benefits under those laws. 
POINT V 
IN WORKERS1 COMPENSATION CONFLICT CASES, STATE 
OF NEVADA DOES NOT APPLY LEX LOCI DELICTI RULE 
WHICH IS ADVOCATED BY DEFENDANTS 
In its brief, Layton cites the case of Tab Construction Co. v. 
Eighth Judicial District Court, 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90 (1967) in 
support of its position that Nevada's interests in this case are 
somehow more compelling than those of Utah. It is interesting to 
note that in Tab, the Nevada Supreme Court, in discussing a 
workers' compensation conflict issue makes no mention of the Lex 
Loci Delicti rule which is advocated by the Defendants herein and 
cites various issues which need to be considered by the trial court 
in determining which state's workers' compensation law should be 
applied. In its brief, Layton has failed to list all of the 
factors listed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Those factors in their 
entirety which are cited by the Court included: Nevada was the 
forum state, the general contractor was a Nevada resident, Nevada 
was the place of the injury, the place where the employment 
relationship existed, the place where the general contractor's 
business was localized, and the place where the employees worked. 
Id. at 91. 
If Layton wishes to rely on Tab in support of its argument, 
then it is clear that Utah's "interests" and "contacts" in this 
case are more substantial than Nevada's. Granted, Nevada was where 
Mr. Shaw was working when he was injured. However, Utah is the 
forum state, Layton, which is the general contractor, is a Utah 
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resident and its business is localized in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Furthermore, the place of Plaintiff's employment was Utah. He was 
hired by Harv & Higham Masonry which is a Utah corporation and he 
performed several jobs for his employer in Utah prior to working on 
the Nevada project. Of further significance, and as has been 
stated earlier, the subcontracts between Layton and Plaintiff's 
employer and Defendant Steel Deck were executed in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Layton concedes that it is not a Nevada resident but argues 
that the fact that the state of Nevada is owner of the Project 
should somehow make a difference. The Nevada Supreme Court in Tab 
did not list the ownership of a project as a determining factor. 
Furthermore, the state of Nevada is not a party to the action and 
Plaintiff has no intention of naming it as a party. 
Layton argues that since Plaintiff "chose" to work for his 
employer in Nevada and joined a union there, then he has availed 
himself of Nevada's "benefits". The state of Nevada has bestowed 
no benefits whatsoever on the Plaintiff. The only reason Plaintiff 
was paid more was due to the fact that he received a per diem 
living allowance while he was temporarily living in Nevada while he 
worked on the Project. This is a common benefit provided to 
construction workers who are temporarily assigned to jobs away from 
their place of residence and was a benefit given to Mr. Shaw by his 
Utah employer, and was not a benefit which came from the State of 
Nevada. 
Plaintiff did not receive any benefits, including workers' 
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compensation benefits from Nevada. And now, Defendants are arguing 
that Nevada's workers1 compensation laws should be applied in 
depriving Plaintiff of his right to recover for his injuries caused 
by negligent tortfeasors. Such a negative and oppressive outcome 
for the Plaintiff is anything but a benefit. 
One final distinction in the Tab case which needs to be 
pointed out, is the fact that in Tab the lawsuit was filed in 
Nevada against the general contractor which was a Nevada resident. 
As stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Tab: 
Significant is the fact that it is the state 
of the forum. If the forum state is 
concerned, it will not favor the application 
of a rule repugnant to its own policies, and 
the law of the forum will presumptively applyF 
unless it becomes clear that non-forum 
incidents are of greater significance. Id. at 
91. 
Utah, as the forum state, has established, as its policy, the 
right of injured workers to seek recovery from negligent third 
parties pursuant to §35-1-62. The application of Nevada's workers1 
compensation laws, which prohibits such actions is so clearly 
repugnant to that policy, that no elaboration is needed. 
The factors which favor the application of Utah's workers' 
compensation laws have been dealt with in great detail in 
Plaintiff's initial brief as well as this Reply Brief. Taking into 
consideration all of the factors which the Nevada Supreme Court 
deems to be important and of significance, it is clear that the 
workers' compensation laws of Utah would be applied, especially in 
light of the importance which the state of Nevada places on the 
interests of the forum state and not necessarily those interests of 
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the state where the injury occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Plaintiff's initial brief and as set forth 
hereinabove, the prevailing authority states that the application 
of the rule of Lex Loci Delicti in workers1 compensation case, is 
inappropriate due to various policy reasons. The current trend 
throughout the country applies a different choice of law standard 
in cases of this type wherein the law of the state where the 
injured party resides, where he was employed, and where he received 
his workersf compensation benefits is applied in determining his 
right to bring a third party action, not the workers1 compensation 
laws of the state where he was injured. 
The application of the rule advocated by this Plaintiff 
affords the same, and in some cases better, stability in the 
application of law and prevents the "scourge of forum shopping" 
which seems to be of concern to the Defendants herein. 
Furthermore, Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act was and is 
intended by the Legislature and, according to decisions of this 
Court, to have extraterritorial effect and the benefits provided by 
the Act, including the right to bring a third party tort action, 
are conferred upon Utah residents who are injured while temporarily 
working in another state for a Utah employer. 
The prevailing rule being adopted by numerous jurisdictions is 
not the "most significant contacts" or the "interest analysis" 
approaches which are advocated by the Defendants. However, even 
under these theories, it is clear that Utahfs interests and 
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contacts with the parties and the events are so significant that 
there is no reason why Utah's workers1 compensation laws should not 
be applied. Furthermore, as enunciated by the Nevada Supreme Court 
in the Tab Construction case, the fact that Utah is the forum state 
together with the other elements involving the residence of the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants in Utah is of such profound 
significance that Utah's laws should be applied. 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully reguests that 
the Orders of the Trial Court granting Summary Judgment and 
Dismissal be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the Trial 
Court for further proceedings. 
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